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HEARINGS

Before The
Subcommittee on International Operations and
Subcommittee on Asian on Pacific Affairs

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of the

Committee on Foreign Affairs

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

HEARING TO EXAMINE THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE
KILLING OF THE UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO AFGHANISTAN
THE HON. ADOLPH DUBS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

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House of Representatives
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on International Operations
Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs

Washington, D.C.
April 26, 1979

STATEMENT OF:

PAGE

Hon. Anthony Quainton
Director for Combating Terrorism
Department of State

3

Ronald D. Lorton
Country Officer
Department of State

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James W. Lannon
Office of Security
Department of State

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1 HEARING TO EXAMINE THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE
2 KILLING OF THE UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO AFGHANISTAN,
3 THE HON. ADOLPH DUBS

4 - - -

5 THURSDAY, APRIL 26, 1979

6 - - -

7 House of Representatives

8 Committee on Foreign Affairs

9 Subcommittee on International
10 Operations and

11 Subcommittee on Asian and
12 Pacific Affairs

13 Washington, D.C.

14 The subcommittee met at 10:10 a.m. in room 2172, Rayburn
15 House Office Building, Hon. Dante B. Fascell (chairman of the
16 Subcommittee on International Operations) presiding.

17 Present: Representatives Fascell, Wolff, Ireland, Hall,
18 Goodling, Pritchard.

19 Mr. Fascell. The Subcommittee on International Operations
20 and the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs meet jointly
21 today to examine the circumstances surrounding the killing of the
22 United States Ambassador to Afghanistan, the Hon. Adolph (Spike)
23 Dubs on February 14 of this year.

24 I understand that Mrs. Dubs was in the United States at the
25 time of the death of her husband. I would like to take this
opportunity to express to Mrs. Dubs on behalf of the committee
our condolences. Her husband was one of this country's most

1 accomplished diplomats. His counsel and skills were a tremendous
2 loss to this country.

3 Our witness is the Hon. Anthony Quainton, Director^{of the office} for
4 Combating Terrorism, Department of State. Ambassador Quainton is
5 accompanied by Ronald D. Lorton, Country Officer, and James W.
6 Lannon, Office of Security.

7 With us today is the Chairman of the Asian and Pacific Affairs
8 Subcommittee, Hon. Lester L. Wolff. Both our subcommittees, of
9 course, are interested in this entire matter.

10 Mr. Ambassador, I understand you have a prepared statement,
11 you may proceed.

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STATEMENT OF HON. ANTHONY QUAINTON, DIRECTOR FOR
COMBATING TERRORISM, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Ambassador Quainton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Chairman
Wolff, members of the committee.

Mr. Fascell. Will you pull the mike closer to you?

Ambassador Quainton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate
this opportunity to meet with you to review the tragic events in
Afghanistan in which Ambassador Dubs lost his life. My Foreign
Service colleagues and I are extremely grateful for the strong
support and continuing concern of the Congress for the well-being
and safety of official American personnel abroad, as well as,
indeed, of all Americans.

Unfortunately, in 1978 there was no reduction in the inter-
national terrorist threat. Americans, both official and private,
were its victims. Our facilities and installations continued to be
attacked. Events in Tehran and Kabul, and the recent murder of
an American serviceman in Izmir and the wounding of another, have
reminded us of the tragic fact that America and its representatives
abroad are symbolically the most visible targets for those who use
violence and terror to achieve their aims.

"Spike" Dubs is the latest casualty of the Foreign Service in
a series of terrorist incidents going back for more than a decade,
which have already taken the lives of five U.S. Ambassadors.

Over the last year we have worked to enhance our preventive
and protective measures. We have taken important steps to up-
grade our contingency plans and our crisis management capability,

1 and to build an international consensus against terrorism.

2 During the past seven months, our crisis management structures v
3 have been utilized in a number of instances: in the seizures of
4 the Chilean Consulate in San Juan and the West German Consulate
5 General in Chicago; in the TWA hijacking to Geneva and the LOT
6 hijacking to West Berlin; and most recently in the kidnapping of
7 Ambassador Dubs. While we have improved our capabilities to deal
8 with such situations, no crisis management structure can guarantee
9 the successful resolution of a terrorist incident, particularly
10 overseas where our influence may be limited and where communications
11 are less than perfect. These limitations were all too evident in
12 the Kabul incident.

13 As you know, Mr. Chairman, the Department of State is the
14 lead agency in dealing with foreign terrorist incidents involving
15 Americans or American interests. Less than one hour after being
16 alerted by our Operations Center of Ambassador Dubs' kidnapping,
17 the Department's Office for Combating Terrorism, under my direction,
18 had organized its Working Group which functioned as the central
19 coordination point and crisis center throughout the course of the
20 incident. We were in direct contact by telephone and telegraph
21 with our Embassy and with the various government agencies whose
22 resources were or might have been needed.

23 In the immediate aftermath of "Spike" Dubs' death, the
24 Department began a thorough investigation into the circumstances
25 of the incident. That investigation is still going on. We have

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1 been examining our actions and procedures for lessons learned. We
2 contacted all governments to establish, in advance, guidelines and
3 understanding^s for handling hostage situations involving our
4 officials. The responses have been positive, indicating widespread
5 readiness to cooperate with us in the future. Further, we asked all
6 our diplomatic and Consular posts world-wide to conduct an immediate
7 reassessment of protective security measures being provided to
8 Chiefs of Mission and principal officers. Based on those responses,
9 we are implementing increased security measures at certain posts.

10 In the specific case of Afghanistan, we have made clear to
11 that government our strong displeasure over their actions, which
12 resulted in the death of Ambassador Dubs. Protests have been
13 registered with the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister,
14 and Deputy Foreign Minister. On the day of Ambassador Dubs' death,
15 the Acting Secretary of State also protested to Soviet Ambassador
16 Dobrynin the role played by Soviet advisors at the Kabul hotel,
17 where Ambassador Dubs was being held. Subsequently, Ambassador
18 Toon discussed the incident with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko
19 in Moscow.

20 Finally, as a result of our ongoing review of our relations
21 with Afghanistan, and taking into account the circumstances sur-
22 rounding Ambassador Dubs' death, the President has decided to
23 reduce severely our economic assistance program and to terminate
24 our military training program in that country. We have also
25 carefully reviewed our other activities in Afghanistan to ensure

1 they are consistent with the current state of our relationship
2 and our security concerns.

3 I will be pleased to answer any questions which you, Mr.
4 Chairman, or members of the committee may have about any of these
5 matters.

6 Thank you.

7 Mr. Fascell. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. Before we
8 turn to questions, would you briefly describe the circumstances of
9 the Ambassador's killing?

10 Ambassador Quainton. Yes, sir. On the morning of February
11 14, as the Ambassador was going to the Embassy from his residence,
12 at about 8:45 in the morning --

13 Mr. Fascell. At what time?

14 Ambassador Quainton. 8:45 in the morning, the Ambassador's
15 car was stopped to acknowledge the command of what appeared to be
16 an ordinary Afghan policeman. Four armed men entered the
17 Ambassador's car and ordered the chauffeur at gunpoint to drive
18 them to the Kabul Hotel in downtown Kabul.

19 The terrorists proceeded with the Ambassador to a room in
20 the hotel. Embassy officials and Afghan police went quickly to
21 the scene.

22 Over the next four hours, before the assault on the room where
23 Ambassador Dubs was being held, we had intense consultations,
24 meetings with the Afghan government in which we stressed to the
25 police officials with which we were in touch, and other officials

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1 of the Foreign Ministry our strong view that no action should be
2 taken which could jeopardize the Ambassador's life. As you know,
3 Mr. Chairman, that advice was not heeded and the Afghan police
4 moved to force entry to the room where Ambassador Dubs was being
5 held captive at about 12:50, just four hours after Ambassador Dubs
6 was taken hostage.

7 In that assault an exchange of gunfire occurred, resulting
8 in the fatal wounds to the Ambassador. We do not know with any
9 certainty at this point who fired the shot that actually killed
10 the Ambassador; that is part of the ongoing study which my colleagues
11 in the Office of Security are carrying out. As I indicated in
12 my testimony, we followed up on his death with a series of
13 protests to the appropriate authorities.

14 Mr. Fascell. Just as part of that description, do we know
15 why the Ambassador was taken to the hotel?

16 Ambassador Quainton. We have no information on that point of
17 which I am aware.

18 Mr. Fascell. It does strike you as curious, does it?

19 Ambassador Quainton. It ^{is} ~~does~~ indeed ^{curious} ~~^~~ that they should have
20 chosen a central place in downtown Kabul. I should say that,
21 although we have no confirmed understanding of why that was, we
22 have assumed that the purpose of taking him to a central place
23 was so that negotiations could be carried out to meet certain
24 demands which the terrorists may have had.

25 Mr. Fascell. But we do not know if they even had any demands.

1 do we?

2 Ambassador Quainton. All we know is what the Afghan
3 government had told us, which is that they demanded the release
4 of an Afghan called Bahruddin Bahes. We have been told that they
5 did demand his release in the course of that morning. We know very
6 little about Bahes, and whether that was in fact their demand is
7 not certain.

8 Mr. Fascell. Did you say in your description of the
9 circumstances that other people were killed?

10 Ambassador Quainton. Yes.

11 Mr. Fascell. Who were the other people who were killed?

12 Ambassador Quaintain. The other people that were killed were
13 the terrorists who were holding Ambassador Dubs.

14 Mr. Fascell. How many of them?

15 Ambassador Quainton. There were three who we believe were
16 killed at the hotel, [and if I am not mistaken] four bodies were
17 subsequently shown to us by the Afghan government as having been
18 the terrorists involved. Our people who were at the hotel at no
19 time were aware of more than three people who were there. There
20 is some discrepancy here which our investigation is pursuing.

21 Mr. Fascell. Where were the U.S. people at the hotel at
22 the time of the shooting?

23 Ambassador Quainton. They^y were at various places at the
24 hotel. They were in the lobby in consultation with the Afghan
25 officials and, at the time of the actual shooting they were, I

1 believe, in the hall some distance away from the actual entrance
2 to the room where Ambassador Dubs was.

3 Mr. Fascell. Chairman Wolff?

4 Mr. Wolff. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

5 There are a number of circumstances that surround this
6 situation that deeply trouble us, Mr. Ambassador. This incident
7 took place at approximately the same time as another incident was
8 taking place in Iran. I am troubled whether the sufficient
9 attention was paid to this event that was paid to the event in
10 Iran.

11 I have copies of the cables, transmission; they are in-
12 consistent with some of the points that you have just made. For
13 example, one of the terrorists was still alive when he was taken,
14 he was on his feet.

15 Ambassador Quainton. That is correct, sir, yes.

16 Mr. Wolff. So, when the terrorists were originally taken
17 there were two that possibly were alive; one was said to be dead,
18 another was pretty badly bloodied and it was thought that he
19 might be alive. The fourth one was still alive, that was the
20 hooded terrorist, the one that they brought upstairs.

21 Now, if they were subsequently killed, have any representa-
22 tions been made to the Afghan government relative to the opportunity
23 of questioning the one who was alive at that time?

24 Ambassador Quainton. We have not raised that specific issue
25 as far as I am aware, Mr. Chairman. We have demanded on a number

1 of occasions from the Afghan government a full report of the
2 circumstances, including the autopsy reports on those who were
3 killed, and ballistics information, and so forth. We have not
4 received adequate information from the Afghan government on these
5 points.

6 Mr. Wolff. Is there any reason why you did not ask to
7 interrogate the fourth man, or the people there did not ask to
8 interrogate the fourth man while he was still alive?

9 Ambassador Quainton. My recollection is that [there was] very,
10 very little time [that] elapsed. He was taken away immediately and
11 we were shown the bodies only a few hours later, [I believe] is that ✓
12 correct, Mr. Lorton?
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1 STATEMENT OF RONALD D. LORTON, COUNTRY OFFICER

2 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

3 Mr.. Lorton. I do not believe that the fourth man was ever
4 seen at the hotel.

5 Mr. Wolff. All right, suppose it was the third man.

6 Ambassador Quainton. There was a third man, Mr. Chairman, that
7 was alive. Our people saw one dead, one very probably dead, and
8 a third man who was taken away alive.

9 Mr. Lorton. That is right. By the time we were notified by
10 the Afghan government that we would be able to see the bodies of
11 the terrorists, that was the first word we had of which terrorists
12 were in their custody and what had happened to them. When we were
13 advised of this, all four had been killed.

14 Mr. Wolff. You are sure there was a positive identification
15 made by our Embassy of the man that was supposedly killed as being
16 the same man that was brought upstairs with the hood?

17 Ambassador Quainton. Yes, sir; that ^{is} {was} our understanding.

18 Mr. Wolff. During the period of time, I notice that you
19 indicated the Embassy had been in touch with you right away, at
20 9:55 you were contacted; is that correct?

21 Ambassador Quainton. That is correct.

22 Mr. Wolff. Are there any communications that you have,
23 records of conversations you had with the Embassy?

24 Ambassador Quainton. I did not have a conversation with the
25 Embassy until some time later.

1 Mr. Wolff. It says that the Operations Center alerted
2 Ambassador Quainton, who took action to establish the Working Group,
3 which was operational at 10:40.

4 Ambassador Quainton. That is correct.

5 Mr. Fascell. Will the gentleman yield for a moment?

6 Mr. Wolff. Yes.

7 Mr. Fascell. Since we are dealing with the chronology at
8 this point, without objection, we will include in the record the
9 Chronology of Major Events in the Death of Ambassador Dubs.

10 Mr. Wolff. I thank the Chairman.

11 (The document follows:)
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1 Mr. Wolff. The information that is given to us here is
2 unclassified and states that the Operations Center alerted you at
3 9:55.

4 Ambassador Quainton. That is right.

5 Mr. Wolff. And you established a Working Group at 10:40.
6 What I am getting at is, were there any MemComs at all that are a
7 record of the conversations that took place between your Working
8 Group and the Embassy?

9 Ambassador Quainton. Let me explain, Mr. Chairman, if I may,
10 what transpired in the Operations Center where we were, and how
11 we handled the communications in this particular crisis.

12 I was alerted, as the chronology says, at 25 minutes after
13 midnight. I was at home, asleep. I immediately came in and
14 assembled a team of people. I was not at the Operations Center
15 at that time. [As soon as] we assembled, [which was] about half an
16 hour ^{to} 45 minutes later, the group of people who worked with me -
17 including Mr. Lorton, [including] members of my own staff and others,
18 we had at that time [I think] at our disposal some three or four
19 rather short messages from our Mission, including the fact that
20 the Ambassador had been taken hostage; that ^{our} people were at the
21 hotel; that they ^{Embassy} wanted our assistance in getting in the military
22 attachee's aircraft from Islamabad with the [resident,] the regional
23 psychiatrist, [which] we felt [very much], and [which] they felt,
24 ^{That he} [correctly] could potentially have been of assistance in any
25 negotiating situation; ^{he could have given} [giving] advice about hostage negotiation.

1 We were not, for almost an hour after my arrival and the
2 establishment of the team, in telephonic conversation with Kabul.

3 Mr. Wolff. Excuse me for one moment. Was this at the con-
4 current period that the situation was taking place in Iran?

5 Ambassador Quainton. That is correct.

6 Mr. Wolff. Were you in any telephonic communication with
7 Iran at that time?

8 Ambassador Quainton. I was [so] preoccupied, to be quite
9 honest, with the Afghanistan situation. [certainly efforts were
10 made] we were operating in Crisis Centers very close one to the
11 other, the Iranian taskforce being on one side of the Operations
12 Center, the Afghan taskforce being on the other. I was vaguely
13 aware of efforts to contact Tehran by telephon^e. I cannot honestly
14 tell you - I can certainly find out - at what point telephonic
15 communication was established.

16 Mr. Wolff. Could you furnish for the record how many people
17 were in the Working Group on Iran and how many were in the Working
18 Group on Afghanistan?

19 Ambassador Quainton. Surely, sir.

20 I think the working group on Afghanistan was something on the
21 order of eight people throughout most of those hours that we were
22 there.

23 Mr. Wolff. And Iran?

24 Ambassador Quainton. (INSERT)
[I do not know because I was not directly
25 involved in that.] [But] certainly, in the case of a terrorist

1 incident of this kind, our immediate effort is to establish direct
2 contact, continuous contact with the Embassy so that there is a
3 continuous exchange of views. Even the very best telegraphic
4 communications take time, as you will see from just looking at the
5 chronology. When you have two crises at once, feeding messages
6 into a system, [to have] a direct line is of vital importance in
7 being able to deal with the situation.

8 We did not have a direct^{ph} line, however, until about
9 2:30 that morning, although we were in the Operations Center
10 shortly after one. So, there was a period [there] when we were
11 relying on telegraphic communications.

12 Mr. Wolff. During that time period, has your investigation
13 indicated that any contact other than the local contact that
14 was made with the Soviets, was made at any high level?

15 Ambassador Quainton. To the best of our knowledge, [we were
16 not aware of any,] there were no ^{other} contacts during that period with
17 the Soviets. We were only aware of the presence of a Soviet
18 police adviser at the hotel.

19 Mr. Wolff. As I understand it, the Soviet agents were not
20 only advisers, but there was a Soviet agent in with Taroon, the
21 police chief; am I correct in that?

22 Ambassador Quainton. A representative of the Soviet Embassy
23 was seen coming out of Taroon's office. [I believe] He was
24 certainly there at some point. Whether he was there throughout
25 the crisis we do not know. What we now know from a review of all

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1 the information is that there were ^{or five} [I think] four Soviet advisers
2 at the Kabul Hotel, one of whom was the security officer at the
3 Soviet Embassy, Mr. Bakhturin.

4 Mr. Wolff. Am I not correct that the operation itself was
5 fairly well directed by a Soviet adviser who, with his hand
6 signals, indicated the methods that were to be used, and was
7 actually in command of that operation?

8 Ambassador Quainton. That is correct in substantial part,
9 Mr. Chairman. My recollection - and my experts will correct me if
10 I am wrong - is that these hand signals were to direct the
11 placement of snipers outside the hotel, shooting towards it from
12 across the street. The Soviets were ^{also} involved inside the hotel.
13 I do not have evidence to suggest that they formally directed the
14 assault i. to the room from within.

15 Mr. Wolff. The investigation you are conducting at the
16 present time, have our people, other than the notification of
17 our protest to the Soviet government, has the Soviet government
18 been cooperative with us, or have we requested cooperation in
19 this investigation from the Soviet government?

20 Ambassador Quainton. We, of course, have been in touch
21 with the Soviet government, both in the context of ^{over-} (a) protest and
22 [then] subsequently with the Soviet Ambassador in Kabul. I am not
23 sure of the extent to which the Soviets have made contributions
24 to the inquiry which the Office of Security has been carrying out
25

STATEMENT OF JAMES W. LANNON, OFFICE OF SECURITY
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Lannon. As of today the Soviets have made no contributions, nor have they been specifically asked.

Mr. Wolff. Is there a reason that they have not been asked, since they were part of the operation? I take it, at the high levels of government, that they would be cooperative. Is there any reason to believe that they would not be cooperative with us?

Mr. Lorton. Mr. Chairman, we did ask the Soviets to explain the role their advisers played in the operation. We were told that they did not play a role in the operation, that they were there to protect Soviet citizens in the hotel. We have been concentrating our efforts on trying to get additional information for the investigation from the Afghan government, which has conducted their own investigation into the matter.

Mr. Wolff. It seems to me that if we cannot monitor the operations of a few Soviet agents who are in Kabul, how are we going to be able to monitor something as vast as SALT?

Mr. Chairman, I would yield at that point and some time later I would like to ask some questions.

Mr. Fascell. Mr. Goodling?

Mr. Goodling. Mr. Ambassador, you touched on it, but what, in your estimation, was the Soviet role in this whole incident?

Ambassador Quainton. As best I have been able to reconstruct what happened - and this is subject to refinement in the report

on
1 which we are currently working on and which will be
2 and which we will be happy to brief the committee on
3 completed - that the Soviets came very promptly to t
4 This^{by} included advisers to the Afghanistan police, who
5 working relationship with the Afghan police, and the
6 officer at the Soviet Embassy^{who} presumably had broader
7 for the security of Soviet citizens.

8 Throughout the period in which Ambassador Dubs
9 held, these various Soviet officials, particularly
10 security officer, were in very close collaboration
11 Afghan officials; ^{There were} repeated discussions to which we
12 privy, in which we were in fact not allowed to part
13 certainly would imply very close consultation betwe
14 sets of police officials as to the steps which ough
15 taken.

16 In the actual assault phase, as I mentioned,
17 element of Soviet direction. We do not have any e
18 suggest that the decision to assault the room [as
19 aware] was a decision of the Soviet government.
20 it was a decision of the Afghan government in which
21 the Soviet advisers concurred, ^{They} [and] gave technical a
22 to carry it out.

23 Mr. Goodling. You also spoke to the fourth i
24 we have any indication at all how he may have died
25 have died; how he met his death?

1 Ambassador Quainton. I do not believe so.

2 Mr. Lannon. That is correct, we do not have any information.

3 Mr. Goodling. But we do know he was alive after the assault?

4 Ambassador Quainton. As the chairman mentioned, in going
5 into the room, one was found dead, one was probably dead [I think
6 it is safe to say] and the third was taken away alive. ^{As to} The fourth
7 figure, we are not [even] sure of his identity. When we had an
8 opportunity to view the bodies, shortly after the Afghan govern-
9 ment ^{asked us to} came in to show us the terrorists ^{who} were dead, our people
10 {did} recognize ^d [the third figure] three of the four. The fourth
11 we were not able to identify at all.

12 Mr. Goodling. But the third figure, then, you did see being
13 taken away alive?

14 Ambassador Quainton. That is correct.

15 Mr. Goodling. And how much later was he seen dead?

16 Mr. Lorton. It was approximately 5 or 5:30 that afternoon
17 when the Embassy officers were allowed to view the bodies of the
18 four terrorists. The Afghan government has told us that all four
19 were killed in the assault on the room.

20 Mr. Goodling. But that is obviously not true.

21 Mr. Lorton. We have not been able to show that that is true.

22 Mr. Goodling. Is our policy one, in dealing with terrorists,
23 of not meeting any demand; or, if that is not our policy, do we
24 have some kind of set policy?

25 Ambassador Quainton. We have had a policy, and have one

1 now in which we make quite clear that in the event of terrorist
2 ^{attacks} [acts] we do not pay ransom and we do not make substantive concessions
3 such as the release of prisoners in American jails. [in order to
4 meet those demands]. This grows out of a conviction that for the
5 United States Government to meet such demands would only be to
6 inviting ^e further attacks on our employees abroad, wherever they
7 might be ^{stated.} [threatened]

8 We look to a foreign government to carry out its responsi-
9 bilities. We do, however, expect ~~as in the case of the govern-~~
10 ~~ment of Afghanistan~~ ^{that point} and a point that we have now made to every
11 government, formally, in the aftermath of the death of Ambassador
12 Dubs, ~~that we expect~~ the very closest consultation with the
13 United States Government before any decisions would be made which
14 would risk the lives of our employees and of our citizens. That
15 remains our policy.

16 Mr. Lorton. If I could go back to the Congressman's
17 question again about the four terrorists. I have located here
18 what we were in fact told by the Afghan government. They stated
19 that when their forces entered the room they found, along with
20 the Ambassador's body, three bodies and one person firing. They
21 claimed that the one who was wounded was taken to a hospital, where
22 he died. Our people did not ever see this fourth individual.

23 Mr. Goodling. Then, one last question. You did talk about
24 who may or may not have given the orders in relationship to
25 assaulting the room. You have in your unclassified information

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1 here the police had received orders to assault. Are you saying we
2 do not have any idea who gave them those orders?

3 Ambassador Quainton. I do not think we know the individual
4 who may have ^{given the orders} [provided that] although I assume it was the commander
5 of the Afghan police. Whether ^{The order} [it] came from a higher level in
6 the Afghan government [obviously] is a point on which we do not have
7 any information, ^{we do not know} at what level that decision was taken inside the
8 Afghan government, whether by the Prime Minister or by others,
9 [we do not know. I think that is correct]

10 Mr. Goodling. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

11 Mr. Fascell. Mr. Ireland?

12 Mr. Ireland. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

13 In reviewing the beginning of the incident when the car
14 was stopped, you said that three terrorist got into the car; is
15 that correct?

16 Ambassador Quainton. I forgot^a how many did get into it.

17 Mr. Lannon. Four terrorists.

18 Mr. Ireland. And what became of the driver at that point,
19 he was told to drive to the hotel; right?

20 Ambassador Quainton. And then was released.

21 Mr. Ireland. The driver was released.

22 Ambassador Quainton. He was immediately released. He
23 reported immediately back to the Embassy, which was the source of
24 our information.

25 Mr. Lannon. That is correct. He was released with

1 instructions to report to the Embassy.

2 Mr. Ireland. So, that left the four so-called terrorists,
3 one of which you never got any idea. Did the driver participate
4 in the identification of the terrorists later on, and what kind
5 of light did he cast on this nebulous fourth terrorist?

6 Mr. Lannon. He participated in the identification and was
7 only able to positively identify three of the terrorists that
8 had been in the vehicle.

9 Mr. Ireland. But there had in effect been four in his
10 vehicle.

11 Mr. Lannon. That is correct.

12 Mr. Ireland. There was considerable talk in the press and,
13 I guess just talk, about warnings that had been received. Would
14 you elaborate some on that and if so, why nothing was done; or,
15 if something was done?

16 Ambassador Quainton. The warning^{which we} received^{and} which you correctly
17 note^{ed} has been widely reported on in the press, was received the
18 year before, in March of 1978, indicating^{It} that there was a general
19 threat to the American community, to American facilities in Kabul.

20 At that time we immediately, in the light of that threat -
21 which was not specific in terms of any individual who was being
22 targeted - [we] sent in a special training team from the Office
23 of Security. We reviewed a whole range of procedures and
24 requested from the Afghan government a car to accompany the
25 Ambassador on his movements, ^{we} and substantially upgraded the security

1 of the Kabul Mission in response to that threat.

2 No subsequent threat was received between that time and the
3 attack on Ambassador Dubs. ^{My understanding is that} ~~Indeed~~, subsequent ^{later} to about six weeks,

4 [if I am not mistaken, in March of 1978] the present government

5 came to power; the previous government was overthrown, and the

6 bodyguards provided to the Ambassador ^{were withdrawn.} ~~no longer came~~. Apparently, ^{It was the}

7 judgment of the Ambassador at that time - Mr. Dubs' predecessor -

8 that there was not a sufficient threat to him ^{or} to his mission, to ^{necessitate}

9 [request] ~~the reinstitution of that~~ special protection, although

10 the ^{general} level of protection which was being provided by our

11 security personnel remained in effect. That decision was

12 continued by Ambassador Dubs, ^{and} he did not have, as the record

13 shows, an escort car [at this time] at the time at which he was

14 killed.

15 I might comment that we have requested ^{special} [that] protection for

16 our Charge D'Affairs ^e in Kabul [and] although it was ^{withdrawn} granted that

17 is a follow-car and bodyguard protection. ^{it} it has been withdrawn

18 by the Afghan government, against our wishes. We continue to seek

19 this ^{protection} from the Afghan government, but they have not seen fit to

20 provide ^{it} [that] to us.

21 Mr. Ireland. Do I understand from what you said that you

22 sent a special team after that warning in there, gave this

23 special training to the people there, required that additional

24 protection. Then, as the new government came in, who made the

25 decision that was no longer necessary?

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1 Ambassador Quainton. The Ambassador.

2 Mr. Ireland. Who did?

3 Ambassador Quainton. The Ambassador.

4 Mr. Ireland. And do you have knowledge on what grounds this
5 new, untested government was suddenly going to be so protective
6 that this was not needed? How do we get that decision, on what
7 grounds it was made after your expert team indicated there was
8 ground for concern?

9 Ambassador Quainton. The expert team was not there as a threat
10 assessments/ team, ^{It was there} [but] to enhance the security of the Mission by
11 reviewing physical security.

12 Mr. Ireland. But it was their recommendation that to enhance
13 security you needed that kind of protection.

14 Ambassador Quainton. I am not certain whether that is so,
15 Congressman, I would have to find out. I think probably it was
16 a decision of the Ambassador to request directly from the Afghan
17 government [that] additional protection; I am sure it was concurred
18 in by our security team. Whether it was their recommendation,
19 which was followed, or the other way around, I do not honestly
20 know. I can find out.

21 Mr. Ireland. Does this indicate an inadequacy in the
22 training that they were sent to do, or an inadequacy in the
23 assessment of what the problem was?

24 Mr. Lannon. Congressman, if I may, maybe I can clarify this.
25 Upon receiving ^{PT} of the March 1978 threat, during the process of

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1 assessment, we deemed it prudent to enhance the security posture
2 of the post and provide additional protection to the Ambassador.
3 Over the period of time that elapsed from the receipt of the
4 initial threat, and based upon continual assessment, it was
5 ascertained that that threat was decreasing.

6 Mr. Ireland. Who was making that assessment?

7 Mr. Lannon. The assessment was made by various components
8 of the Department.

9 Mr. Ireland. But they had to take constructive memo
10 notice of some kind to say, "Our assessment is that we no longer
11 need this protection", is that right?

12 Mr. Lannon. Well, it ^{was done} ~~is done~~ in conjunction with the post
13 as well, the Ambassador, as he perceived the situation at post.
14 At the time the threat was received the security posture was
15 greatly increased, special training was provided, special
16 briefings were provided.

17 Mr. Ireland. Well, could we know from you, or how would we
18 know that an unknown, relatively unknown government in this
19 change taking place would suddenly decrease the need and change
20 the assessment to such laxity? I mean, what were the compelling
21 reasons for lowering the guard all of a sudden?

22 Mr. Lannon. No, the ^{posture} ~~guard~~ was lowered before the new
23 government came to power.

24 Mr. Ireland. I did not understand that from the Ambassador.

Mr. Lannon. Well, I may be mistaken on that.

1 Ambassador Quainton. My understanding ^{is} [from having the] ^{ed} That The
 2 Department consult ^{about} [indeed] Ambassador El/iot/ after the Dubs
 3 incident [as to what] the circumstances [were] at the time, [that] he
 4 ^{apparently} [had] determined that in light of the security ^{posture} which the ~~was~~
 5 Afghan government was maintaining ⁱⁿ [throughout] Kabul and [indeed]
 6 throughout the country [of a very vigorous kind] that ^{The bodyguards} he would
 7 ~~not request~~ ^A it would have required a new request. The previous
 8 ~~guards had been provided by the old regime, which had been swept~~
 9 ~~away that it was not necessary to make an additional request.~~
 10 ^{It} [That] was a conscious decision of our Ambassador, ~~not to make~~
 11 ~~that request~~ [I understand.]

12 Mr. Ireland. The Ambassador previous to Ambassador Dubs?
 13 Ambassador Quainton. That is correct.

14 Mr. Ireland. There is no record of the advice of that
 15 assessment that would be available to us, and why such a decision
 16 was made?

17 Ambassador Quainton. Let me answer that question for the
 18 record, Congressman. I do not have the answer as to whether there
 19 was a specific request put to the Department.

20 Mr. Ireland. Mr. Chairman, would it be possible to ask that
 21 we get that information?

22 Ambassador Quainton. We will be happy to get that information
 23 for you.

24 Mr. Ireland. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

25 (COMMITTEE INSERT:)

1 Mr. Fascell. Mr. Hall?

2 Mr. Hall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

3 In regard to our Ambassadors world-wide, do most of them
4 heed the warnings on terrorist groups, do they follow certain
5 precautions?

6 Ambassador Quainton. The situation varies enormously from
7 one country to another. We share with every Ambassador whatever
8 intelligence is available which might indicate a threat to him
9 personally, or to his Mission. We seek his advice and the adv
10 of the Security Watch Committee which exists in every Embassy
11 *It is composed of* representatives of all [agencies] key agencies [with a role] th
12 assessment [ment of] the information and intelligence. We provide
13 own assessments from the Department and, in the light of th
14 assessments, we ^{will} [can] provide special protection to our Miss
15 This may include the dispatch of special security teams, f
16 armored vehicles, a range of measures.

17 These measures are not provided to all Ambassadors
18 times because there is not sufficient threat in many co
19 where we work, to do so. But this process is one which
20 continually reviewed. Security Watch Committees are e
21 meet regularly to review their security situation. ↑ We

22 sure [in the aftermath of the killing of Ambassador Du
23 ^{2 situation} looked at that systematically across the board; went ^{we}

24 [single] one of our Embassies and Consulates and asked

^{any} are you aware of local threats; is t
A

1 you need, whether it is in terms of protecting the Embassy
2 building, protecting your residences, protecting yourselves in
3 your vehicular movements."

4 Ambassadors came back to us, describing exactly what they
5 have and their assessment of whether it was adequate or not adequate.
6 On the basis of a number of recommendations that have come to us
7 from those ^{That} [where they] felt there were deficiencies, the Office of
8 Security, out of its budget, will be meeting ^{any} [those] deficiencies
9 that exist.

10 Mr. Hall. In regard to Ambassador Dubs, apparently he was
11 a very, very courageous man, very fearless, always has been, all
12 his life. I would imagine many of our Ambassadors are like this,
13 across the world. I guess the question is, it has to be almost
14 impossible to protect them.

15 It has to be, if not a fairly easy, not necessarily a
16 complex type of plan to probably kidnap or assassinate an
17 Ambassador or an American VIP abroad, if you want to. I do not
18 envy you your position, knowing full well some of our Ambassadors
19 overseas.

20 I guess the other question I ask, is there any reason to
21 believe with respect to the assassination of the Ambassador
22 and the Soviets' role, allegedly, and the way it was done, it looks
23 to have been a mistake, an act of incompetence. And yet, could it
24 possibly be a very, very carefully prepared plan to assassinate
25 him and to try to present a smoke screen to the world where in

1 fact Ambassador Dubs was really assassinated through a very, very
2 carefully planned execution? I do not know, I ask the question
3 because it is just amazing to me that a major country, a world
4 power like Russia, would be so involved with a hideous act on
5 an American personnel. I guess one way to put a smoke screen
6 around it is crying incompetence, major mess-ups, and try to blame
7 it on everybody else when it fact it could have been planned. Is
8 that possible, do you have any reason to believe it?

9 Ambassador Quainton. We have no reason to believe that is
10 the case. Our assessment of the Soviet counter-terrorist tactics
11 is ^{that} [one where] they [do] tend to use force [rather more readily] as a
12 regular procedure, whereas we attach enormous importance to playing
13 for time to negotiate. ^{we try to} [to discussion] wear[ing] down the terrorists
14 by non-violent means. [I think there may be an element here in
15 which] tragically, tactics which were totally inappropriate in
16 the situation were used, which resulted in the death of our
17 Ambassador.

18 But as to your suggestion, we have no reason to suppose that
19 is the case.

20 Mr. Hall. I just kind of think you have an impossible job.
21 I do not know how you can protect Ambassadors overseas if they do
22 not listen. When you have Ambassadors who are courageous and
23 fearless, like Ambassador Dubs, who was tremendously respected in
24 the world, it has to be an impossible job.

25 Ambassador Quainton. We try to provide the very best

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1 protection possible ^{but} [and we keep in mind that] protection is not
 2 our only consideration. Many of our Ambassadors - and I see them
 3 as they go out in the field, and I see them when they come back and
 4 ^{we} talk about whether there is a terrorist problem in their country -
 5 are very concerned that they ^{may not} [will] be able to do their job ^{of} [they
 6 represent ^{ing} ^{as} America [which is] an open society, [and] if they have
 7 to go about - as a few of them do - with enormous security measures,
 8 cars in front, cars behind, special armoring. I talked to one
 9 Ambassador yesterday, ^{our} [the] Ambassador to Lebanon, who said he had
 10 yet to set foot on the sidewalk in Beirut. He only goes ^{our} under
 11 very special security. ^{we} [You] have to do that ^{when there are} [in that] particular
 12 circumstance. ^s [and] ^{we} [will] do whatever is necessary to protect our
 13 Ambassadors.

14 But obviously ^{these} [they, who are] courageous men in the service of
 15 the country ^{it} want to represent America in the best possible way.
 16 [There is tension here, and there always will be] We ^{back here} [back here]
 17 are trying to make sure that they are aware of whatever threats
 18 ^{There are} [they run] and that they get the protection which they need. But,
 19 it will never be foolproof.

20 Mr. Hall. Thank you.

21 Mr. Fascell. Mr. Pritchard?

22 Mr. Pritchard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

23 You have been touching on some of the things I want to ask,
 24 which is, when the level of terrorism goes up, there is no fool-
 25 proof system, unless that is going to be your primary concern. Is

1 that not right?

2 Ambassador Quainton. That is correct.

3 Mr. Pritchard. It is not our primary con
4 one item for a person serving overseas, it can
5 Also, I would imagine you have to look at how
6 Ambassadors operate in that country. It is ve
7 person to be running around in a tank and ever
8 driving around in a car.

9 Ambassador Quainton. We got that very co
10 ^{our} of Embassies {when we went out} after Ambassado

11 Mr. Pritchard. The final decision as to
12 operates has to rest with the Ambassador himse

13 Ambassador Quainton. That is correct.

14 Mr. Pritchard. He makes that assessment.

15 Ambassador Quainton. We give him as much
16 can, on the information we have.

17 Mr. Pritchard. And some people are just
18 careful than others, perceive the dangers diff

19 Ambassador Quainton. That is correct. W
20 there are certain minimum levels, I would say.
21 that Embassies have certain minimum standards
22 we are constantly {trying to upgrade them, are}
23 try to make sure that residences have certain
24 There are some things we can legitimately and
25 Chief of Mission to do as basic security for h

1 personnel. When you get into special kinds, then ^{of security} ~~the~~ considerations
2 which you mentioned have an important role to play.

3 Mr. Pritchard. What do you see, do you see any way in which
4 this rise in terrorism, these actions are going to be stopped?

5 Ambassador Quainton. We are trying to stop them in a couple
6 of ways. [I guess] the only long-term way in which [the] terrorism
7 will be stopped is when the political grievances which give rise
8 to it are finally resolved. [I think] the very intense efforts
9 which this administration has been making to find peace in the
10 Middle East; majority rule in Southern Africa; negotiated settle-
11 ments in Central America, are all directed at finding solutions
12 to those situations which generate violence in general, and
13 terrorist violence in particular. That is certainly the long-term
14 goal.

15 The other major thrust of what we have been trying to do is
16 to build a consensus internationally that there are certain acts
17 that are inadmissible under the law of war and under the law of
18 peace. That may be hijacking; that may be the seizure of
19 diplomats. There is an international convention against the seizure
20 of diplomats, there are forty countries that are party to it. We
21 have just gone out, in fact, in the aftermath of Ambassador Dubs'
22 death to any country that has not become a party ^{to that convention} saying, "Why are
23 you not concerned about the protection of diplomats?"

24 In February of this year in Geneva a convention dealing with
25 the taking of hostages [in general] was drafted. [which] ^{it} we hope will be

1 ^{soon} finalized. There are only two small clauses which are not fully
2 agreed. Our government is going to give the very strongest
3 support to the building of ^{an} international consensus that some
4 things are just inadmissible. The taking of hostages, whether
5 they [may] be Ambassadors, or whether they [may] be Peace Corps
6 volunteers, [whoever it may be] is just something which the
7 international community should not tolerate.

8 Mr. Pritchard. Well, there are two items here. One, it
9 seems that these actions cannot end up as a plus for the host
10 country. I mean, that has to be the rule, it is a negative to
11 them, however severe, it is a negative factor.

12 The other, I would certainly agree with the policy that
13 there cannot be any reward; there cannot be a giving in; there
14 cannot be any gain by terrorism, it has to be a losing operation.
15 I think that is very hard for people to understand but, if you
16 take any other position, you open the door. The first time one
17 of these Ambassadors is held up for ransom and you pay the
18 ransom, why, you really opened up the possibility for all our
19 Ambassadors to be attacked. I would agree, the problem is
20 difficult and it is going to get more difficult as terrorism seems
21 to spread all over the world.

22 I would agree that it is a no-end situation.

23 Let me ask you one question. There is a report that a
24 Russian was with the chief of police during the time this whole
25 altercation was going on. At the same time, there was an American

1 attempting to see the chief of police and he was not given an
2 audience. After it was over, why, the chief of police and the
3 Russian came out of the office. Is that correct?

4 Ambassador Quainton. That is correct. The most frustrating
5 aspect of the management of that incident was our inability to
6 get access at a suitably high level, ^{to} get across our basic
7 position that nothing should be done to risk the life of Ambassador
8 Dubs. If people keep their doors closed, you cannot force your
9 way in.

10 Mr. Pritchard. Thank you very much.

11 Mr. Fascell. I would like to go to square one for a minute.
12 Three so-called terrorists were in the room at that time, one of
13 whom was alive and subsequently, a few hours later, would up
14 dead. Those three people, would you put their names in the
15 record, please?

16 Mr. Lorton. We do not have the names and cannot put them in
17 the record. We have asked for identities and have not received
18 them.

19 Ambassador Quainton. We have asked for a full report on
20 the deaths of those *persons*.

21 Mr. Fascell. You have asked for a full report from the
22 Afghan government and have not received it.

23 Ambassador Quainton. That is correct *[on that point]*

24 Mr. Lorton. We have not received an identification of the
25 terrorists.

1 Mr. Fascell. Have you received any communication?

2 Mr. Lorton. Yes, we have received information from the Afghan
3 government on their views of what has happened. But it does not
4 respond to the questions we have put to them.

5 Mr. Fascell. You have received a communication from the
6 Afghan government on their views as to what happened. You mean
7 a chronology of events?

8 Mr. Lorton. In effect.

9 Ambassador. A report of their handling of the incident.

10 Mr. Fascell. Is that report classified?

11 Mr. Lorton. The report is not classified.

12 Mr. Fascell. I do not know why it should be.

13 Mr. Lorton. There is a problem, though, which perhaps Mr.
14 Lannon would like to speak to, that is, while the investigation
15 is still in progress. we have not tried to release individual
16 aspects of the investigation, or individual statements about it.
17 I think that the report will be available, though, when the
18 investigation is completed. Will it not?

19 Mr. Lannon. It will be, yes.

20 Mr. Fascell. Well, we would of course like to see all the
21 communication from the Afghan government; and of course the
22 report, when it is completed.

23 Ambassador Quainton. I have that information and would be
24 happy to give it to you, Mr. Chairman.

25 Mr. Fascell. Now, the fourth individual, of course, you do

1 not know his name, either.

2 Ambassador Quainton. No, we do not.

3 Mr. Fascell. Now, after the shooting, at some time - the
4 same day, was it - the Afghan government displayed four bodies
5 to whom?

6 Ambassador Quainton. To officers of the Embassy and to the
7 driver.

8 Mr. Fascell. Officers of the Embassy and who?

9 Ambassador Quainton. ^{To} The driver ^{and to} American personnel. I
10 do not know how many. I believe three officers and the driver
11 were taken there.

12 Mr. Fascell. Can we have their names in the record, please,
13 of the three Americans who viewed the bodies of the four people
14 who were dead?

15 Ambassador Quainton. Yes.

16 Mr. Fascell. Do you know who they are now?

17 Ambassador Quainton. I do not know. This will all form
18 part ^[I think] of the formal report that we will be briefing the
19 committee on. I do not have the names in my head of the various
20 officers who did specific acts in the course of the incident.

21 Mr. Fascell. Well, the actions and the statements of
22 every individual American who participated is part of the
23 investigation, is it not?

24 Ambassador Quainton. That is correct.

25 Mr. Fascell. Well, for starters, we would like to have the

1 names in the record now of those three that viewed the bodies,
2 and at what time they viewed the bodies, and what they were told
3 at that time. That is something that should not in any way
4 prejudice the ongoing investigation.

5 Ambassador Quainton. We will get that information for you.

6 Mr. Fascell. Also, who was the Afghan official who made
7 the presentation.

8 Ambassador Quainton. Fine. I do not have that information
9 here.

10 Mr. Fascell. On the site of the killing, is it our
11 information that the chief of police, the Afghan chief of police
12 of Kabul, is that who he was? Was he the chief of police at
13 Kabul?

14 Mr. Lorton. The police commandant for the country.

15 Mr. Fascell. The police commandant of the country. So, he
16 was a national officer, not a municipal officer.

17 Mr. Lorton. That is correct.

18 Mr. Fascell. Now, what is a police commandant in Afghanistan?

19 Mr. Lorton. He is the senior police official in the country,
20 in the Ministry of Interior.

21 Mr. Fascell. A national police force, as distinguished from
22 a military?

23 Mr. Lorton. Yes, it is a police force separate from the
24 military, although there are, we understand, military officers
25 who have deputed to it from time to time.

1 Mr. Fascell. Military officers are detailed to the national
2 police, are they?

3 Mr. Lorton. That is our understanding.

4 Mr. Fascell. So, Mr. Taroon, is that his name, is the
5 national police commandant of Afghanistan.

6 Mr. Lorton. That is right.

7 Mr. Fascell. And he was in charge of the operation at the
8 hotel.

9 Mr. Lorton. He was at his office, but we believe he was
10 in charge of directing the operation, yes.

11 Mr. Fascell. I see. Well, do we know who the Afghan
12 official at the hotel was who appeared to be in charge, or was
13 in charge?

14 Mr. Lorton. I do not have the name of that individual, but
15 it may be in the material we have; we can look.

16 Mr. Fascell. When was the first demand made for the release
17 of the prisoner by the so-called terrorists? You gave his
18 name earlier, I just did not get it.

19 Ambassador Quainton. Bahruddin Bahes, B-a-h-e-s, is the
20 prisoner ^{whom} [which] the Afghan subsequently identified to us as the
21 man.

22 Mr. Fascell. Let me see if I understand that correctly.
23 A man named Bahes was in jail in Afghanistan, being held by the
24 Afghan government. Was he an Afghan national?

25 Ambassador Quainton. I believe they said he was not being

1 held.

2 Mr. Fascell. They said what?

3 Ambassador Quainton. I believe they said he was not being
4 held and they hence ^{They} could not release him, ^{That} is my recollection.

5 Mr. Fascell. Well, what demand exactly did the terrorists
6 make, when did they make it, and to whom did they make it?

7 Mr. Lorton. According to what we have been advised by the
8 Afghan government, the individual who was in charge of the
9 operation at the hotel was the chief of the Kabul police depart-
10 ment. I do not know his name.

11 Mr. Fascell. We do not have his name. Could we get it,
12 do you suppose?

13 Mr. Lorton. I think we could get it, yes. It indicates
14 that when he went to talk to the terrorists through the door of
15 the room in which they were holding the Ambassador captive, they
16 informed them that a condition was to release this individual,
17 Bahruddin Bahes from Prison.

18 Mr. Fascell. Give me that again, I am sorry; I missed that.

19 Mr. Lorton. When he went to the room --

20 Mr. Fascell. When who went to the room?

21 Mr. Lorton. The chief of police of the Kabul police
22 department.

23 Mr. Fascell. When he went to the room. Go ahead.

24 Mr. Lorton. He was informed by the terrorists, when talking
25 to them through the door of the room, that their first condition

1 was the release of this individual. Now, it does not stipulate
2 a time here, as to when that was. But it was very shortly after
3 the terrorists themselves went to the hotel.

4 Mr. Wolff. Will the gentleman yield at that point?

5 Mr. Fascell. Yes.

6 Mr. Wolff. Was not that first demand made of the other
7 kidnapper who was down in the lobby, not this man Bahe? Was not
8 one of the terrorists taken by the police downstairs in the
9 lobby when they came in, and was not the request by the terrorists
10 in the room for that man to be brought up? Was not that the
11 request that they made?

12 Mr. Lorton. Well, this, Congressman, is getting into the
13 issue of the varying accounts we have of what happened, and the
14 reason we are still in the course of conducting the investigation.
15 What I have just told you is what we were told by the Afghan
16 government, happened.

17 Now, we also have other accounts of what happened. These
18 questions are going to be addressed in this report.

19 Mr. Wolff. Then the information you just handed up to us
20 here is not all the information that you have from the Afghan
21 government.

22 Mr. Lorton. No. We have their views on their handling of
23 the incident, which we have not released, for the same reason we
24 have not released other individual accounts.

25 Mr. Fascell. But as far as you know right now, getting back

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1 to the question of demand of the release of an individual who was
2 in jail, or allegedly in jail, that demand was made, according
3 to the Afghans, that demand was made by the terrorists who were
4 holding Ambassador Dubs in the hotel room to the chief of police
5 of Kabul.

6 Mr. Lorton. That is right.

7 Mr. Fascell. He talked through the door and, I gather, no-
8 body else was with him, as far as we know.

9 Ambassador Quainton. No.

10 Mr. Fascell. No other person was with the chief of police.

11 Ambassador Quainton. I do not know that.

12 Mr. Fascell. What?

13 Ambassador Quainton. I do not know the answer to that,
14 whether he went to the door and there were other police officers
15 beside him, or not.

16 Mr. Lannon. We would have to assume that there were other
17 officers present, Afghan officers, present.

18 Mr. Fascell. Well, let me get back a different way, then,
19 on this chronology of events. When was the first time, according
20 to our own chronology of events, that an American official
21 appeared at the hotel?

22 Ambassador Quainton. Very shortly after 9 o'clock the first
23 American officials arrived.

24 Mr. Fascell. And who was that, and how many of them?

25 Mr. Lorton. At 9:15 officers of our Embassy were able to

1 establish contact with the police officer at the hotel.

2 9:15 they were there.

3 Mr. Fascell. Who were "they"?

4 Mr. Lorton. At this point, Mr. Chairman, I defe
5 of the Office of Security, ~~and investigation~~

6 Mr. Lannon. There were three Embassy officers a
7 service national who arrived at the hotel at that poi
8 have the names with me.

9 Mr. Fascell. Could we get those?

10 Mr. Lannon. Certainly.

11 Mr. Fascell. Now, I assume the foreign national
12 language purposes?

13 Mr. Lannon. Yes, sir.

14 Mr. Fascell. We would like to have his name, t

15 I assume that the three Americans who were ther
16 speak Afghan, or whatever language they speak? What
17 language, by the way?

18 Mr. Lorton. Dari is the language.

19 Mr. Fascell. Is that the principal language,
20 many languages?

21 Mr. Lorton. There are two principal languages
22 and Pushtu is the other. We did have a Dari speaker
23 Embassy officers.

24 Mr. Fascell. A Dari speaker was among the Emb
25 The foreign national could speak Pushtu?

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1 Mr. Lannon. I do not know which dialect he spoke.

2 Mr. Fascell. Could you find out?

3 Mr. Lannon. Yes.

4 Mr. Fascell. Do we know whether any of them spoke Russian?

5 Ambassador Quainton. Yes, we do. There was at least one

6 officer who spoke Russian. ^{Jan} Mr. Bakhturin spoke excellent

7 English, ^{was} who is the senior Soviet officer who was there.

8 Mr. Lorton. Mr. Chairman, the Embassy national employee,

9 the Afghan employee, could interpret both Dari and Pushtu.

10 Mr. Fascell. The foreign national was a U.S. Embassy

11 employee?

12 Mr. Lorton. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

13 Mr. Fascell. He accompanied the first American officials

14 to the hotel.

15 Mr. Lorton. Correct.

16 Mr. Fascell. And Bakhturin was the senior Russian official

17 at the hotel, and he speaks fluent English.

18 Mr. Lorton. That is correct.

19 Ambassador Quainton. Right.

20 Mr. Lorton. And we had a Russian speaker among our own

21 officers there as well.

22 Ambassador Quainton. [Sorry] Mr. Bakhturin was the senior

23 security official from the Embassy, we are not certain he was

24 the senior Russian official there [according to the investigation

25 which was subsequently taking place]

1 Mr. Fascell. He was the senior security official of the
2 Soviet Embassy at the hotel, but you are not sure he was the
3 senior soviet official at the hotel; is that what you are saying?

4 Ambassador Quainton. That is correct.

5 Mr. Fascell. The demand that was made of the chief of police
6 of Kabul for the release of Bahes was communicated to the Americans
7 by whom and when?

8 Mr. Lorton. I would have to check the record, Mr. Chairman,
9 but to my knowledge it was not until after the incident.

10 Mr. Fascell. Not until after the killing?

11 Mr. Lorton. Correct. We can check the record and establish
12 that for certain.

13 Ambassador Quainton. My recollection, from having been in
14 the Operations Center and in contact with the Embassy throughout
15 that period is that we had no clear idea what demands were being
16 levied on the Afghan government, not precise information at any
17 point. We had not reason to suppose that any demands were being
18 levied on the United States Government.

19 Mr. Fascell. Well, you had no reason to know that any
20 demands had been levied on the Afghan government.

21 Ambassador Quainton. But we assumed that that was the case.
22 If demands would have been levied on the United States Government,
23 we obviously would have heard that.

24 Mr. Fascell. You did not know about any demands on the
25 Afghan government until after the incident, that is quite clear;

1 is it not?

2 Mr. Lannon. I ^{would like to} ~~could~~ go back to Mr. Wolff's question before,
3 about the release of the terrorist who was believed to be down-
4 stairs. Bakhturin at one poin' advised the American officers
5 present that the terrorists in room had requested the release
6 of the captured terrorist. Bakhturin came to our officers, and
7 it was at approximately 11:30 a.m., to advise that the terrorists
8 in the room had demanded of the Afghan government that the
9 terrorist that had been captured be returned.

10 Those were the only demands we were aware of until after
11 the incident.

12 Mr. Fascell. Well, what happened to this guy that was in
13 the lobby, allegedly, that Bakhturin was talking about?

14 Mr. Lannon. We had the observation that he was brought up
15 to the room and was removed after the shooting with the hood
16 remaining over his head, attempting to fight off the Afghans that
17 were holding him. The next time he was observed was when he
18 appeared with the bodies which our Embassy officers observed.

19 Mr. Fascell. So, he was definitely seen in the lobby alive?

20 Mr. Lannon. He was seen on the stairway alive.

21 Mr. Fascell. He was taken to the room, we believe; is that
22 correct?

23 Mr. Lannon. That is correct.

24 Mr. Fascell. And then he was later observed dead.

25 Mr. Lannon. He was later observed coming down from the room

1 alive.

2 Mr. Fascell. Alive.

3 Mr. Lannon. Alive. And ^{later} ~~then~~ ^{was} that afternoon ~~was~~ observed
4 with the other three bodies that were shown to our Embassy
5 officers.

6 Mr. Fascell. So, by 5:30 in the afternoon that man was dead.

7 Mr. Lannon. That is correct.

8 Mr. Wolff. If the chairman will yield.

9 Mr. Fascell. Yes.

10 Mr. Wolff. Three bodies you saw, or four bodies?

11 Mr. Lannon. No, I said he was one of the four bodies. He
12 was seen with the other three bodies. In other words, four
13 bodies were observed that afternoon, including that individual.

14 Mr. Fascell. Now, what information do we have on that
15 individual Bahes, any?

16 Mr. Lorton. We have no confirmed information about him, Mr.
17 Chariman. We are looking into the various possibilities and
18 speculations that people have provided to us. This will be part
19 of the report, I assume.

20 Mr. Fascell. Have we asked to talk to this individual?

21 Mr. Lorton. No one has been able to identify whether
22 this individual is even alive, or where he is.

23 Mr. Fascell. And the only information we have that there
24 is such an individual, by that name, is the fact that the chief of
25 police of Kabul said the terrorists asked for his release.

1 Mr. Lorton. That is correct.

2 Mr. Fascell. And the Afghan government says, "We do not know
3 of such a man and he is not being held".

4 Mr. Lorton. No, they do know of an individual that they have
5 described as being this person. However, we are not certain that
6 this is the full description, or that this is in fact the
7 individual.

8 Mr. Fascell. Well, I thought I understood somebody to say
9 before that the Afghan government said that they were not holding
10 such an individual.

11 Mr. Lorton. I believe they did say that.

12 Ambassador Quainton. They characterized the terrorists as
13 a group of extreme leftist adventurers, without being much
14 clearer. That was in the press conference.

15 Mr. Fascell. I am just trying to find out who Bahes is, if
16 he exists.

17 Ambassador Quainton. We do not have any information on him.

18 Mr. Fascell. Is that part of your investigation?

19 Mr. Lorton. Yes, it is. The Afghan government stated that
20 Bahes is believed to be living in hiding.

21 Mr. Fascell. That is the Afghan's official statement.

22 We are going to take a short recess to answer this quorum call,
23 and we will continue as soon as we get back.

24 (Whereupon, a short recess was taken.)

25 Mr. Fascell. The committee will come to order.

1 When we left, we were asking you to provide information on
2 the reports, or allegations, with respect to the demands of the
3 kidnappers. Now, there was one report - I guess it was a press
4 report, I am not sure - that there were three people, kidnappers,
5 that requested the release of Bahes.

6 Ambassador Quainton. If I might, Mr. Chairman, amplify or
7 correct ^{personal} [indeed] an answer which I gave to Chairman Wolff on
8 this point because my ^{personal} recollection of the events of that night,

9 [as I was involved with them,] was [indeed] that we did have
10 additional information on [this] ^{the} point of what the demands were.

11 [In clarifying my memory on this point,] ^{the} what we were told from
12 our Embassy was that they overheard a conversation in which it
13 was said that the terrorists were demanding the release of three
14 religious leaders. I believe we have those names, and we set
15 in motion the normal checks to see if we could identify them,
16 and we indeed could identify several of those names, as I
17 recollect.

18 It seemed to us to be plausible, given the events in Iran
19 and elsewhere, that perhaps the release of religious leaders
20 might ^{have been the} [indeed a kind of] terrorist ^{'s'} demand, [in that part of the
21 world.]

22 As we testified earlier, the Afghan government said [no,]
23 as far as they were concerned the only demand was for the release
24 of a leftist, Mr. Bahes. This points ^{out} [to] the enormous numbers of
25 inconsistencies which we have turned up as we have investigated

1 this case, as the Office of Security has investigated it] all of
2 ~~the information~~ [which] are going to be reviewed in detail in their report. We now
3 have no reason to suppose that there was a demand, beyond that
4 one overheard conversation for the three Mullahs; but that may
5 also have been the real demand and [for whatever reason] the
6 government of Afghanistan may have chosen to change their report
7 to us after the event.

8 I cannot tell you what the real demands were. We have had
9 these two differing reports, one during the incident, and one
10 after.

11 Mr. Fascell. Well, it seems to me it is important. Certainly,
12 the kidnapping is not an unrelated, inconsequential, no-motive
13 act; they had to have a reason. If they wanted to kill the
14 Ambassador, they could have shot him in the car, do you not
15 think so?

16 Ambassador Quainton. That is correct. We were very
17 concerned that the Embassy give us whatever might be available
18 about possible motives, so that we could give them the best
19 possible advice about how to deal with the incident. If they
20 had been Mullahs, we ^{thought we should} considered [] seriously the question of whether
21 or not there were perhaps Islamic governments that could be
22 helpful [and so forth] It is very important to know what the
23 real demands are. Our inability to get that information hindered,
24 in fact, our ability to aid our Mission in what was obviously a
25 very, very difficult situation.

1 Mr. Fascell. Well, the point is, you could not negotiate
2 because you did not know what you were negotiating about.

3 Ambassador Quainton. That is correct.

4 Mr. Fascell. It is obvious that the kidnappers had some-
5 thing in mind or they would not have gone to a hotel, highly
6 visible, and locked themselves in a room, obviously easily
7 reached - either outside or inside - a totally indefensible
8 position from simply a security or a military point of view.
9 Obviously, they had something in mind, but they are all dead and
10 we do not know what they had in mind.

11 Ambassador Quainton. That is correct.

12 Mr. Fascell. Now, the United States was frustrated in
13 getting any information early on in this matter from anybody,
14 I gather. One, you could not talk to the national commandant
15 at all; is that correct, during the incident?

16 Ambassador Quainton. There was one telephone conversation
17 with Taroon early on, in which we conveyed ^{our} [the] government's
18 position that no precipitous^{ate} action be taken. And there was a
19 conversation with the Deputy Foreign Minister [a personal
20 conversation.]

21 Mr. Fascell. And that made the same request.

22 Ambassador Quainton. That is correct. And those requests
23 were made on the site both to the Russians and to the Afghans.

24 Mr. Fascell. And those were the only two people that you
25 had an opportunity to make that request of?

1 Ambassador Quainton. [I believe] that is correct, ^{only those} officials
2 of the Afghan government. That is my recollection. We ^{tried and} were not
3 able to contact { and tried } the Deputy Prime Minister, the
4 effective leader of the country.

5 Mr. Lorton. If the chairman will refer to the chronology
6 which was made part of the record, we do note there that the
7 Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr. Dost, had called back to our DCM
8 to say that -- well, it does not state it specifically here, but
9 it implied he had been in touch with the Foreign Minister and Deputy
10 Prime Minister, Mr. Amin because he said Amin was personally
11 supervising the developments.

12 Mr. Fascell. He was personally supervising the developments,
13 who is "he"?

14 Mr. Lorton. This is the Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime
15 Minister.

16 Mr. Fascell. One of them was personally supervising the
17 events, who is he?

18 Mr. Lorton. The same person, Mr. Chairman.

19 Ambassador Quainton. The number two [ranking] man in the
20 Afghan government.

21 Mr. Fascell. And you were never able to contact him again?

22 Ambassador Quainton. We were never able to contact him
23 directly.

24 Mr. Fascell. Now, the ranking security officer of the
25 Russian Embassy, what was his name, Bakhturin?

1 Ambassador Quainton. Bakhturin, yes.

2 Mr. Fascell. Did we ever talk to him and give him the same
3 information?

4 Ambassador Quainton. Yes.

5 Mr. Fascell. And when was the first request made to him
6 to take no precipitous action until you had an opportunity to
7 talk to the kidnappers?

8 Ambassador Quainton. Quite early on that morning, ten-
9 something. He expressed some [comprehension, some] understanding of
10 that view, if I remember correctly.

11 Mr. Lannon. At 10:15, and he assured the Embassy officer
12 present that there was a strong Soviet interest in the safety
13 and well-being of the Ambassador at that time.

14 Mr. Fascell. I am sure that is true. You had no other
15 conversations with him subsequent to that time?

16 Mr. Lannon. There were frequent conversations. He was
17 the principal contact point for some period of time between the
18 Embassy officers present and the Afghan officials on the scene.

19 Mr. Fascell. So, he had full knowledge of what the U.S.
20 position was on this matter.

21 Mr. Lannon. Yes, he did.

22 Mr. Fascell. And you have no way of knowing whether he
23 communicated that to the chief of police.

24 Mr. Lannon. Yes, as a result of subsequent conversations
25 we are sure that it was communicated. Whether it was to the chief

1 of police himself or one of his aides, we are not sure.

2 Mr. Fascell. But you are reasonably sure that the ranking
3 Soviet person did communicate the U.S. request.

4 Mr. Lannon. That Bakhturin did, yes. We do not know whether
5 he was the ranking Soviet at the scene, though.

6 Mr. Fascell. I mean, he was the security man at the scene.

7 Mr. Lannon. That is correct.

8 Mr. Fascell. Do you know whether or not autopsies were
9 performed on the four terrorists?

10 Ambassador Quainton. We have asked for the autopsy reports,
11 we have not received them.

12 Mr. Fascell. Maybe no autopsy was performed.

13 Ambassador Quainton. That is very possible.

14 Mr. Fascell. But you do not know that. All you have done
15 is request an autopsy report, and you had no response.

16 Ambassador Quainton. We have repeatedly requested that information
17 and requested the ballistics information which would be critical,
18 [of course,] in determining who it was that actually fired the
19 fatal bullets.

20 Mr. Fascell. Well, we have all the ballistics information
21 obtainable from Ambassador Dubs' body.

22 Ambassador Quainton. That is correct.

23 Mr. Fascell. What kinds of weapons were the kidnappers
24 carrying?

25 Mr. Lannon. I think we are getting into an area here which

1 may cause problems with the furtherance of our investigation at
2 his point. We would be more than happy to supply the information
3 that was provided to us, as well as the ballistics information
4 that results from the autopsy. However, we would prefer to do
5 that in a closed session or by document to the chairman.

6 Mr. Fascell. Do you mean by that - and I agree with that -
7 do you mean by that that there is some dispute?

8 Mr. Lannon. There is information which we are attempting
9 to gain at this time where, if we reveal the information we
10 have in our possession, it might hinder our investigation.

11 Mr. Fascell. Mr. Wolff?

12 Mr. Wolff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

13 Do we have any information on Bahes? Did he have any contact
14 or prior history with any Soviet activity?

15 Ambassador Quainton. I do not know the answer to that.

16 Mr. Lorton. We have not been able to specifically identify
17 Mr. Bahes at all because we have a number of various possibilities.
18 These are what the investigation is attempting to reconcile and
19 come up with an answer.

20 Mr. Wolff. There was a rumor circulating that this was a
21 case of mistaken identity, and that the individual which was
22 supposed to be kidnapped was not "Spike" Dubs but the Russian
23 Ambassador. Did you hear anything about that?

24 Ambassador Quainton. I have heard the rumor [I guess] We
25 [do not have any reason to] ^{can not} confirm that, [that I am aware of.]

1 Mr. ~~Lannon~~ ^{Lannon} ~~Berton~~. In fact, the Russian Ambassador is very heavily
2 guarded in Kabul and would be much more difficult to kidnap.

3 Mr. Wolff. On the demands we know of and any other information
4 do we have any idea whether or not this was a religious group that
5 was involved, or a political group?

6 Ambassador Quainton. Well, as I suggested a minute ago,
7 the fragmentary information which we had in the course of the
8 incident suggested that it was a religious group, seeking the
9 release of religious prisoners. We were able to confirm during
10 ^{the} {that} night that {indeed} a number of religious leaders were in jail
11 in Afghanistan, ^{and} it seemed to us possible - without any
12 further confirmation - that that was the demand the terrorists
13 were making. Obviously, that was never pursued because the
14 government of Afghanistan said, no, that was not the case and has
15 taken a different tack.

16 Mr. Wolff. We have only a few minutes because we have to go
17 over to vote. The driver of the vehicle that Mr. Dubs was riding
18 in, what about his history, how long has he been with the Embassy;
19 what is his background?

20 Mr. Lannon. He has been with the Embassy for some period of
21 ~~time. My recollection is~~ ¹⁸ ~~(25) years.~~ ~~[but I am not actually sure~~
22 ~~on that amount of time.]~~

23 Mr. Wolff. Has he been questioned thoroughly? It seems
24 to me to release him to call the Embassy seems a little bit
25 peculiar.

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1 Mr. Lannon. Yes, he has been questioned thoroughly and in
2 fact has been polygraphed.

3 Mr. Wolff. With positive results?

4 Mr. Lannon. No deception was indicated in the polygraph
5 examination.

6 Mr. Wolff. Now, I take it that we have "Entebbe" groups,
7 rescue teams. Were any rescue teams alerted to this situation
8 at all?

9 Ambassador Quainton. This is a fairly sensitive area, Mr.
10 Chairman, which I would be happy to discuss in some greater
11 detail with the committee --

12 Mr. Wolff. I just want to know if there were any steps
13 taken.

14 Ambassador Quainton. I was going to deal with the general
15 question. When a crisis of this kind takes place ^{and} [comes to] the
16 Operations Center of the State Department, ^{is informed} one of the very first
17 things we do is to call the National Military Command Center
18 and the Central Intelligence Agency's Command Center, ^{They} [who] have
19 also been alerted by those first flash messages which come in,
20 [saying such and such has happened, to ^{we} make sure that we are aware
21 of ^{all} any contingencies, any requirements ^{are} [that can be] coordinated
22 [effectively] from the State Department. That was done in this
23 case. The National Military Command Center in such situations
24 establishes a Terrorist Action Team, as they call it AT - which
25 operates out of the NMCC, and which maintains contact with a

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1 variety of resources, including our various potential rescue
2 resources. The military issue, which was immediately before us
3 in this crisis [in the early hours] was, could we get our military
4 attache's plane in from Pakistan with a doctor and a psychiatrist,
5 and that, of course, required a series of military clearances
6 through the appropriate commands.

7 We were in very direct touch with NMCC throughout.

8 Mr. Wolff. Was any attempt made to reach the Prime Minister,
9 since we tried to reach the Deputy Prime Minister? Did we try
10 to reach the Prime Minister of Afghanistan at all?

11 Ambassador Quainton. I do not know whether we did try to
12 reach Mr. Taraki [is it]

13 Our instructions to the DCM from the Secretary, which ^{we} ~~he~~
14 prepared in the Task Force were [I think] to go to the highest possible
15 level [he could get to] in the Afghan government.

16 Mr. Wolff. No direct approaches were made by the Secretary
17 or anyone else to higher levels of the government. All the moves
18 were made from Afghanistan directly.

19 Ambassador Quainton. From the Secretary to the Foreign
20 Minister, which was Mr. Amin.

21 Mr. Wolff. From the Secretary to Mr. Amin. He called Mr.
22 Amin?

23 Ambassador Quainton. This was handled in two ways, in fact,
24 simultaneously, in order to cover all possibilities. It was sent
25 out by flash message. The Secretary, as you know, was in the

1 department a good part of that time. So, we were able to
2 coordinate with him very rapidly. We passed the message both
3 telephonically to our Embassy because that was working *effectively*
4 by that point, and telegraphically *as well* *{There was a tele-*
5 *phonic communication as well.}*

6 Mr. Wolff. Mr. Ambassador, I want you to know that Spike
7 Dubs was a very close friend of mine, and perhaps that is one
8 of the reasons why I am as intense as I am on this point.

9 Do you think that everything was done that could possibly
10 be done to preserve the life of Spike Dubs? Are you satisfied
11 with what was done?

12 Ambassador Quainton. Without sounding complacent, I think we
13 functioned as well as could reasonably be expected - which is
14 not to say that with hindsight, and going over minute by minute
15 what was done in various ways, *that* there might not have been *some*
16 other things which might have been done by us and might have been
17 done in the field.

18 You recognize, I am sure, as we all do, the very considerable
19 pressures which operate in this kind of crisis. It seems to me
20 that all prudent measures were taken.

21 Mr. Wolff. Would you do the same thing again, or do you now
22 have some second thoughts about what was done?

23 Ambassador Quainton. Second thoughts? I think we did learn
24 a great deal from this incident about the handling of crises of
25 this kind, and ^{about} some of the potential bottlenecks. The fact that it

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1 took an hour for a flash message to get through; that telephonic
 2 communications, although not satisfactory, provide the possibility
 3 of a genuine interchange ^{of views} [with your interlocutors], (and) the sooner
 4 you can get this established, the better. Afghanistan is the
 5 most difficult country in the world to do this with.

6 Mr. Wolff. Are you telling us that there is not a line of
 7 communication available through satellite that you could not get
 8 to immediately from there?

9 Ambassador Quainton. Not to Afghanistan. Our Embassy has
 10 good communications, but the mechanical process of sending
 11 messages, typing them out, putting them into the machine ^{takes time}, even
 12 though you might have virtually instantaneous linkages [across]
 13 through satellites [or others, and] the process of [printing out
 14 and so forth] moving the paper ^{is} something with which I am not
 15 satisfied.

16 Mr. Wolff. It seems to me that we are more interested in
 17 the security of the message than we are in the individual, and
 18 that is something that troubles me greatly.

19 Ambassador Quainton. That is exactly the point that I would
 20 make in saying ^{that} telephone is the best way. [It is not secure] it
 21 is not secure, but it is immediate. Our concern was with the
 22 life of Spike Dubs. We ^{found} [used much more effectively] telephonic
 23 links ^{more effective.} Mr. Lorton here was on the line to the Embassy virtually
 24 the whole time; I was on when there was ^a specific need to talk to
 25 somebody.

1 Mr. Wolff. You said there was an hour's lapse.

2 Ambassador Quainton. That is right, it took time to get it
3 set up. Certainly, better communications is something for which
4 there is a real need.

5 Mr. Wolff. With the sophistication of electronic gear which
6 we have today, it would seem to me that is quite an inefficiency
7 and should be remedied.

8 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

9 Mr. Fascell. Well, gentlemen, thank you very much. We will
10 probably call on you again as we proceed in this matter and you
11 have had an opportunity to further your investigation. We
12 will develop a new line of questioning for you when you have
13 completed your own investigation. We will be anxious to pursue
14 the matter further.

15 Ambassador Quainton. We will, Mr. Chairman, be sharing
16 with you our report in due course. I was consulting with my
17 colleague from the Office of Security and he says they will not
18 have it completed because of the extraordinary complexity of
19 the issues, for a number of weeks yet. But I assure you that
20 we desire to work very closely with you to make sure that the
21 appropriate lines of investigation have been pursued and that
22 you have all the necessary information about those tragic events.

23 Mr. Fascell. Let me ask you for the record to furnish
24 the names of the American personnel now stationed in Afghanistan.

25 Ambassador Quainton. Surely.

1 Mr. Fascell. And also a complete list of all kidnappings, and
2 killings of diplomatic personnel, by country, in the last five
3 years - U.S. and foreign. X

4 Ambassador Quainton. We have that information.

5 Mr. Fascell. I want to take a look at the pattern, who
6 gets "clobbered" and why.

7 Ambassador Quainton. Good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

8 Mr. Fascell. The subcommittees stand adjourned, subject
9 to the call of the chair.

10 (Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m. the subcommittees adjourned, to
11 reconvene subject to the call of the chair.)

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